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No. 49
In the often heated debate over campaign
finance reform, few events have generated
more heat than Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott’s selection of Professor Bradley A. Smith
for a GOP seat on the Federal Election
Commission. Critics called Smith, a noted
expert on campaign finance, “unfit” to serve,
his selection “an insult.” Someone on the FEC
with his views, said one critic, is “unthinkable.”
Given that opposition, President Clinton has
thus far refused to nominate Smith. In
response, the GOP has put a hold on Clinton’s
nominee for ambassador to the United
Nations.
What is Smith’s “crime”? In his scholarly
writings, he has challenged the conventional
wisdom by arguing that past campaign finance
reforms have made the system worse and that
most proposed reforms would do the same—
and, more important, would violate the First
Amendment. He urges an end to limits on both
contributions and spending—but with full dis-
closure. Although Smith’s critics call him “rad-
ical,” their attack has raised a question: Just
who is the radical? For in case after case, the
courts have been on Smith’s side, not on the
side of his critics. Indeed, what his critics plain-
ly fear is that Smith, on the FEC, will not be
“radical” enough, will not press the “robust
enforcement” the courts have repeatedly struck
down. For his part, Smith has said he will
enforce the law, but he will not waste the tax-
payers’ money pursuing unconstitutional
enforcement theories. His selection is a breath
of fresh air that should bring needed balance to
the campaign finance debate.
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Introduction
The debate in recent years over campaign
finance reform has often been heated.  Just
as often it has left the impression that there
are only two camps—those who want to
reform the “corrupt” system now in place
and those who want to leave it as it is.
Reformers, who want more regulation, stand
for “good government,” of course; they wear
white hats, whereas those who oppose fur-
ther regulation—to say nothing of those who
call for less regulation—are often branded as
benighted, corrupt, or worse.
At no time, perhaps, has that Manichean
divide come more to the surface than when
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, earlier
this year, selected 41-year-old Bradley A.
Smith, a law professor at Capital University
in Columbus, Ohio, and an adjunct scholar
at the Cato Institute, to fill a Republican
vacancy on the Federal Election Commission.
Out came the long knives, aimed at pressur-
ing President Clinton not to nominate Smith
for the GOP spot. Editorially, the New York
Times called Smith’s selection “an insult.”
The Washington Post labeled him a “radical,”
as did Wall Street Journal columnist Al Hunt,
who added that Smith was “unfit” to serve.
The Atlanta Constitution described him as the
equivalent of a “flat earth society poobah.”
And the Syracuse Post-Standard, throwing all
caution to the wind, likened Smith to David
Duke, the Unabomber, and Slobodan
Milosevic.1
Given that opposition, President Clinton
has thus far refused to nominate Smith to
the GOP seat. That means, of course, that he
is trying to control a seat that, under the
Federal Election Campaign Act, is the GOP’s
to fill. Responding to Clinton’s intransi-
gence, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott has
put a hold on the president’s nomination of
Richard Holbrooke as ambassador to the
United Nations, prompting the Washington
Post to cry foul.2 Thus, the politics of the mat-
ter at this writing.
Efforts to vilify prospective appointees are
not uncommon in Washington, of course,
but they are especially absurd in this case.
Smith has established himself, since graduat-
ing from the Harvard Law School, as one of
the nation’s foremost experts on campaign
finance. His voluminous writings in the Yale
Law Journal, the Georgetown Law Journal, and
elsewhere have been cited approvingly in fed-
eral court opinions and have made him, in
the words of even his most vocal critics, “the
most sought after witness” in Congress
whenever the topic is campaign finance
reform.3 Even the Washington Post, in opposi-
tion to Smith’s nomination, conceded that
he is “clearly qualified.” Why, then, the near
hysteria over this appointment?
Challenging Conventional
Wisdom
Smith’s “crime,” it seems, is to have chal-
lenged the conventional wisdom that drives
today’s campaign finance debate. The thrust
of his writing is that much of what has
passed for “reform” has in fact made the sys-
tem worse. He has shown that limits on con-
tributions have forced candidates to spend
more time fundraising than ever before. He
has demonstrated how contribution and
spending limits help entrench incumbents,
make campaigns longer and more negative,
and reduce political accountability. He has
argued convincingly that the burden of regu-
lation has fallen most sharply on political
amateurs and grassroots activists who lack
the time, technical know-how, and resources
to comply with heavy regulation. But above
all, his writings have demonstrated time and
again how efforts to ratchet up regulation by
closing “loopholes” have eroded First
Amendment liberties.4
Rather than call for more regulation,
Smith has urged deregulation. He would do
away not only with spending limits but also
with the contribution limits the Supreme
Court upheld in its landmark 1976 decision
in Buckley v. Valeo.5 In their place he would
require full disclosure. Sunshine, in short, is
the best disinfectant.
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But that goes against the regulatory
gospel of campaign finance “reform” as pro-
nounced by a troika of “good government”
groups—Common Cause, Democracy 21,
and the Brennan Center for Justice. The
three groups launched a series of attacks on
Smith with a June 3 press release and an
open letter to President Clinton that
denounced Smith as “not fit to serve”
because of his “radical” views.
In thus attacking Smith, however, the
three “reform” groups may have launched,
inadvertently, a national debate that will
come back to haunt them. For the question
their attack has brought to the fore is, Just
what does it mean to be a “radical” on cam-
paign finance reform?
Just Who Is the “Radical”?
Common Cause and its allies have domi-
nated that debate for years. By dictating the
terms for “reform,” the Common Cause
crowd has induced an all but unquestioned
belief that reform requires an ever-increasing
regulatory web around political contribu-
tions and expenditures—and hence, if the
Supreme Court is right, around political
speech. Among other things, the reform
lobby has pushed bills to regulate speech
mentioning a candidate for federal office
within 60 days of an election, to prohibit cit-
izens from organizing committees to sup-
port or oppose candidates, to prohibit citi-
zens from contributing to candidates run-
ning outside their home districts (even
friends and relatives), and to prevent groups
from publishing the voting records of candi-
dates if those records include any words of
praise for or condemnation of the votes there
noted. 
But the reformers have been conspicuous
thus far in their lack of success in getting
Congress to enact their proposals. Thus, they
have turned increasingly to the FEC—an
agency they have largely “captured”—pressing
it to make rules and bring enforcement
actions—what the Washington Post calls
“robust enforcement”—to “reform” the sys-
tem along their favored lines. Yet there too
the reformers have been notably unsuccess-
ful, for the courts have repeatedly struck
down such rules and enforcement actions as
unconstitutional violations of the First
Amendment.
Given that record of failure in both
Congress and the courts, it is not a little iron-
ic for the reformers to be calling Smith “radi-
cal.” For both branches have been with Smith
far more often than with the reformers.
Indeed, the Brennan Center—the reform
lobby’s prime litigation arm since 1995—has
been on the losing side in every reported cam-
paign finance case it has participated in that
has reached final judgment.
Losing Case after Case
Thus, in Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. FEC,6 the Supreme
Court held that political parties, like other
groups, have a right to campaign for their
candidates. More precisely, the Court upheld
the right of parties to make unlimited inde-
pendent expenditures in support of their
candidates—a position urged by Smith in his
writings but opposed by the Brennan Center,
Common Cause, and the FEC.
Again, in North Carolina Right to Life v.
Bartlett,7 the Brennan Center argued that a
North Carolina statute limiting the rights of
nonprofit organizations to engage in issue
advocacy was constitutional. The federal
appeals court disagreed. It struck down a law
remarkably similar to proposals at the feder-
al level. Here again, Smith argued in his writ-
ings that such restrictions on issue advocacy
are unconstitutional violations of First
Amendment rights.
Similarly, in Elections Board v. Wisconsin
Manufacturers & Commerce,8 a Wisconsin state
court declared a state statute regulating
political discussion unconstitutional—
against the intervention of the Brennan
Center supporting the law. Just four months
earlier, on September 18, 1997, the executive
3
By dictating the
terms for
“reform,” the
Common Cause
crowd has
induced an all but
unquestioned
belief that reform
requires an ever-
increasing regula-
tory web around
political contribu-
tions and expendi-
tures—and hence,
if the Supreme
Court is right,
around political
speech.
director of the Brennan Center testified
before the House Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on the Constitution that, in
his opinion, the Wisconsin statute was con-
stitutional. At the same hearing, Professor
Smith averred that it was not.9 Once again, it
was the position of the Brennan Center, not
Smith, that turned out to be “radical.”
The Brennan Center also found itself on
the losing side in Kruse v. Cincinnati,10 where
the court, on First Amendment grounds,
struck down limits on spending in city coun-
cil races. Here too Smith’s published writings
put him, not the Brennan Center, in the
mainstream of judicial thought.
Although Smith has generally agreed
with the positions taken by the courts in
scrutinizing campaign finance regulation
under the First Amendment, he has criti-
cized the Supreme Court’s rationale in
upholding limits on the size of political con-
tributions. It is that position, doubtless, that
has lent whatever credibility there might be
to the charge that he would “sabotage” the
work of the FEC. But that is one area of the
law that calls for little interpretation by FEC
commissioners. As Smith noted in an inter-
view with the Columbus Dispatch, “I’m not
going to be out there saying we won’t enforce
[contribution] limits. They are in the law,
they’ve been upheld by the Court. This isn’t
all that hard.”11
Yet on that issue, too, it turns out that
Smith’s “radical” view is close to the main-
stream of judicial thought. For his skepti-
cism regarding the constitutionality of con-
tribution limits was shared by Chief Justice
Warren Burger, in dissent, in Buckley. And
more recently, in a concurring opinion in
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee, three members of the high court
expressed similar views.
Meanwhile, lower federal courts have
been striking down contribution limits that
are below the $1,000 limit approved in
Buckley. In Shrink Missouri Government PAC v.
Adams,1 2 Russell v. Burris,1 3 Arkansas Right to
Life v. Butler,1 4 and California ProLife Council
PAC v. Scully15 federal courts struck down
contribution limits ranging from $100 to
$500. In each case, the Brennan Center liti-
gated on the losing side. Indeed, the
Supreme Court recently agreed to hear the
Shrink Missouri case, suggesting that it may
think it time at last to review the Buckley
holding on contribution limits.
The FEC’s litigation record is little better
than the Brennan Center’s. In fact, the FEC
has tried so often to expand its authority
under FECA that in Federal Election
Commission v. Christian Action Network, the
appeals court took the extraordinary step of
ordering the FEC to pay the opposing party’s
legal fees. The FEC’s argument was so thor-
oughly contrary to “unequivocal Supreme
Court and other authority,” the court said,
that it “simply cannot be advanced in good
faith.”1 6If nominated and confirmed, Smith
would be an important voice on the FEC in
pulling its aggressive litigation theories back
into the mainstream.
Toward a More 
Balanced Debate
More important, however, Smith’s nomi-
nation may help balance the national debate
about how to structure our campaign
finance laws. From its inception, that debate
has been dominated by the Common Cause
“good government” crowd, demanding ever
more regulation and enforcement. Indeed,
Wall Street Journal columnist Al Hunt sug-
gested recently that violators should “go to
jail” if that would help change the system.1 7
By contrast, Professor Smith, as noted earli-
er, calls for deregulating the system and
focusing the FEC’s resources on promoting
full disclosure of the sources and amounts of
contributions. He reminds us that the
Founding Fathers pledged their “lives, for-
tunes, and sacred honor”—not their fortunes
“up to $1,000 per year.” In a 1996 article in
the Yale Law Journal, Smith summed up his
position this way: “The problems of self-gov-
ernment in the twenty-first century are
unlikely to be resolved by piling more regu-
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lations on top of a failed system of campaign
finance regulation. Instead, we should . . .
take more seriously the benefits of the sys-
tem of campaign finance regulation that the
Founders wrote into the Bill of Rights. . . . It
begins: ‘Congress shall make no law. . . .’”1 8A
more balanced debate over the proper role of
federal regulation would be a refreshing
change from the one-sided morality play we
have today. Indeed, as we will see shortly,
such a debate may already have begun—
thanks to the reformers’ overreaching.
It is abundantly clear that Common
Cause and its allies do not want such a
debate, which helps explain the heated
rhetoric they have directed at the GOP’s
selection of Smith. Their efforts have been
complicated, however, by the more thought-
ful among them. Thus, the Brennan Center’s
legal director, New York University law pro-
fessor Burt Neuborne, wrote to an academic
colleague in 1996 praising “Smith’s excellent
work in debunking the status quo.” He went
on to say: “I find Professor Smith’s piece
among the best skeptical critiques of the
campaign reform movement. I learned from
it, and altered aspects of my own approach as
a result of his argument. It is, in my opinion,
thoughtful scholarship that helps to move us
toward a better understanding of an
immensely important national issue.”1 9
Clearly, Neuborne’s assessment hardly
squares with the reformers’ heated June 3
press release. Drawing selectively from
Smith’s voluminous writings and numerous
public appearances, Common Cause,
Democracy 21, and the Brennan Center
claimed there that he is “unfit” to serve on
the FEC because he believes that “the entire
body of the nation’s campaign finance law is
fundamentally flawed and unworkable—
indeed, unconstitutional,” and because “he
has called . . . for the abolition of the agency
he aspires to head.”20 The reformers support
their contention by citing a 1997 Wall Street
Journal op-ed, which Smith finished with a
rhetorical flourish: “The most sensible
reform is a simple one: repeal of the FECA.”2 1
Here, reformers wrench a single line out
of context: just as the reformers, when they
call for overruling Buckley, do not mean to
refer to that portion of the opinion that
upheld contribution limits, so too Smith,
in an article urging an end to contribution
limits, did not mean to end current disclo-
sure requirements. Indeed, reformers are
well aware of Smith’s work supporting dis-
closure laws and a role for the FEC in
enforcing those laws: their release quotes
from a 1997 article Smith published in the
Georgetown Law Journal in which he stated,
“[D]isclosure provides the necessary infor-
mation to the citizenry to manage the prob-
lem [of corruption].”2 2In another 1997 arti-
cle, in a symposium in the Journal of Law &
Policy in which Professor Neuborne also
participated, Smith wrote of the campaign
finance scandals in the Nixon administra-
tion: “[I]f these revelations proved any-
thing, it was . . . that good, enforceable dis-
closure laws, such as those passed in 1971,
would work.”2 3 Again, in a 1996 article in
the Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy,
Smith devoted several pages to discussing
the benefits of disclosure as a remedy for
corruption.2 4
One does not need to pore over Professor
Smith’s academic writings to fairly read the
selected line. Appearing on national televi-
sion in the fall of 1996 he said: “[W]hat we
really need to do is dump some of these laws,
deregulate the system, require full disclo-
sure. Now people are trying to hide their
contributions. If we open up and let people
contribute, those contributions come into
the open, and then if the voters think it’s
important, the voters can decide.”2 5 Since
those comments were made in a debate with
former Common Cause president Ann
McBride, it is all but impossible that
Common Cause is unaware of Smith’s views
on the matter. Smith has supported disclo-
sure in such public forums as the editorial
pages of USA Today2 6 and congressional
hearings, including a hearing on February 1,
1996, when he shared the witness table with
Ms. McBride. Given that long public record,
the reformers’ claim that Smith opposes
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“the entire body” of campaign finance law is
simply not credible.
In Defense of the
First Amendment
With the reformers’ overreaching, a num-
ber of prominent legal experts have sprung
to Smith’s defense. Thus, Brooklyn Law
School professor Joel Gora, who is also gen-
eral counsel of the New York Civil Liberties
Union and was one of the original Buckley
attorneys, calls Smith’s writings “models of
academic analysis and intellectual integri-
ty”—adding that “far from being ‘radical,’
Smith’s views have prevailed in the courts far
more often than the truly anti–free speech
positions of many of his . . . ‘reform’ oppo-
nents.”2 7 Again, constitutional history pro-
fessor David Mayer notes that “Professor
Smith is an uncompromising champion of
the First Amendment. . . . Ironically, the
Times is in the odd position of opposing
someone because he believes too strongly in
the First Amendment.”2 8 And James Bopp
Jr., director of the James Madison Center for
Free Speech and one of the nation’s leading
attorneys in the field of election law, adds
that “the criticism by Common Cause argu-
ing that Bradley Smith is out of the main-
stream simply reflects the fact that Common
Cause and their allies have such an extreme
position on the ability of the government to
regulate speech that they don’t know the
mainstream when they see it.”29 Indeed, as
Mr. Bopp observes, the reformers’ effort to
tar Smith as a wild-eyed radical actually
shows just how far from the mainstream the
“reform” groups are.
As an example of Smith’s “radical” views,
reformers are left to quote from a 1995 Cato
Institute Policy Analysis in which he wrote,
“FECA and its various state counterparts are
profoundly undemocratic and profoundly at
odds with the First Amendment.”30 That
view may seem “radical” to reformers. It is
not to the Supreme Court. In Buckley, the
Court struck down, on First Amendment
grounds, numerous provisions of FECA,
including limits on candidate spending, lim-
its on independent expenditures made on
behalf of a candidate, limits on what is today
known as issue advocacy, and limits on can-
didates’ contributions to their own cam-
paigns. As Professor Gora notes, “On at least
five occasions since . . . Buckley v. Valeo, the
Supreme Court has struck down campaign
finance controls.” And as the Brennan
Center and Common Cause have learned in
litigation, lower federal courts have also
repeatedly stepped in to strike down state
and local campaign finance regulation on
constitutional grounds.
It is plain, therefore, that the real com-
plaint reformers have is not that Professor
Smith will be too radical but that he will
not be radical enough. Their concern is
that, if seated on the FEC, he would not
pursue the radical theories and “robust
enforcement” the courts have repeatedly
rejected as violating the First Amendment.
As Smith stated in one recent interview, “[If
confirmed on the FEC], I will enforce exist-
ing laws, but I will not go along with wast-
ing taxpayers’ dollars to pursue legal theo-
ries that have been rejected [as unconstitu-
tional] by federal courts.”3 1
Since its creation nearly a quarter of a
century ago, the FEC has been the captive
of groups such as Common Cause and the
Brennan Center, from which they have
made war on the First Amendment rights
of American citizens, restrained only by the
determination of federal judges to uphold
the Constitution. Professor Smith’s nomi-
nation threatens that dominance—and
threatens also to expose the true radicalism
of those “good government” groups.
But it also threatens the very purpose
and, thus, the power of groups like
Common Cause, Democracy 21, and the
Brennan Center. Until now, the Common
Cause crowd has dictated the meaning of
campaign finance “reform.” Bradley
Smith’s potential nomination to the FEC
threatens that dominance. For, as Professor
Mayer writes, “Smith . . . favors real reform,
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in the direction of deregulation.” That is a
debate the “reform” lobby wants desperate-
ly to avoid. As one Smith foe put it, “[T]he
Professor is entitled to his views, . . . [b]ut
there is no reason to give him a platform
like this”3 2—to which the Brennan Center
added, “Mr. Smith . . . is entitled to sit in the
ivory tower and advocate,” but to have such
views represented on the FEC is “unthink-
able.”33 Unthinkable? Better to denounce
him as “radical” and link him to the
Unabomber and Slobodan Milosevic, one
supposes, than to engage in a serious
debate about campaign finance reform.
Such a debate is long overdue. If this nomi-
nation should trigger one, it will have
served a valuable purpose. 
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